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Toilets Not Taxes: Gender Inequity in Dar es Salaam’s City Markets  
 
Marius Siebert and Anna Mbise 
 
 
Summary 
 
In this paper we examine market taxation in Dar es Salaam from a gender perspective. We 
do not find any evidence of gender bias in the way market traders are taxed, but we do find a 
major gender issue that we did not expect – toilet fees. Female traders pay up to 18 times 
more for their daily use of the market toilets than they pay as market tax. High toilet fees 
have a differential and adverse impact on women, who require toilets more frequently than 
men, and have fewer alternatives. This shows that a focus on formal taxation systems does 
not reveal all complex linkages between gender and taxation in the informal sector of 
developing countries. A gender-aware perspective on market taxation requires us to look 
wholistically at gender-differentiated patterns of use and funding of collective goods and 
services. 
 
Keywords: tax; gender; toilets; informal sector; service provision; hygiene; local authorities; 
Tanzania. 
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Introduction  
 
Are taxation systems in Africa biased against women? This is a hard question to answer, and 
there is very little literature on the topic.1 Most of the literature on gender and taxation relates 
to high-income countries, and refers to treatment of women relative to men in the collection 
of personal income tax. But this is almost entirely irrelevant in low-income countries in Africa, 
where only a very low proportion of the population pay personal income tax, and almost all of 
these are men (Joshi 2017).  
 
There is a widespread feeling that, if we want more insight into the gender dimensions of 
taxation in Africa, we need to look much more closely at the taxation of women traders. It is 
in that role that women most frequently interact with tax collectors. There is a limited 
literature on this subject, which suggests that, in at least some cases, women may have to 
pay higher taxes than similarly-situated male traders, and may also suffer from sexual 
harassment (Carrol 2011). 
 
We examined the relative tax burden of men and women traders in nine city markets in Dar 
es Salaam to throw more light on this topic. 
 
Our findings were surprising, and certainly raise issues about the debate on gender and 
taxation that need to be taken seriously. On the one hand, we find no difference between the 
various taxes and fees that male and female market traders are required to pay. Similarly, 
there seems to be little evidence of significant sexual harassment of women traders. On the 
other hand, toilet fees constitute a considerably higher financial burden than the official 
market tax for the vast majority of traders, and especially for female traders. Many female 
traders pay 18 times more for their daily use of market toilets than they pay as market tax.2 If 
security fees, garbage collection fees and fees for cleaning the market are taken into 
account, the daily toilet fees paid by a female market trader are on average five times higher 
than all other daily fees and taxes combined. In many cases female traders have to pay 20 
per cent of their daily income on toilet fees. Adequate access to safe toilets is imperative for 
women’s dignity, health and safety. Women need bathroom facilities far more than men. 
Women urinate more when they are pregnant, need to change sanitary pads when they are 
menstruating, and cannot easily go to the next tree or bush to relieve themselves. 
Disproportionately high costs to access toilets are an important gender issue, and clearly 
disadvantage women.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 provides a short overview of existing literature on 
the gender dimensions of African market place taxation; Section 2 outlines the methodology 
and summarises the organisational arrangements of market management in Dar es Salaam; 
and Section 3 summarises and discusses the main research findings.  
 
 
1  Literature review 
 
Studies on market taxation and gender in other African countries have shown that the 
interactions between women working in the informal sector and tax collectors are often 
based on an unequal power relationship, and involve informal practices. Some of these 
informal practices are regarded positively by the female traders, because they involve taking 
personal circumstances into account. For example, Prichard and van den Boogaard (2015) 
find in Ghana that the elderly, sick, young mothers or recently widowed were granted 
                                                          
1  Some of the literature includes: Stotsky (1997), Smith (2000) and Grown and Valodia (2010). 
2  As compared to 8 to 12 times more in case of male market traders. 
 
 
7 
exemptions from rules in accordance with social norms. In other cases, however, informal 
practices reinforce existing inequalities, and tax collectors are reported to use their power 
over female taxpayers to overtax them. Prichard and van den Boogaard report that some tax 
collectors in Ghana tend to extract additional revenue from foreign or illiterate women. A 
study by Carrol (2011) conducted on marketplaces in Ghana finds that tax collectors 
sometimes behave oppressively: for example, seizing the possessions of traders who were 
unable to pay their taxes, and asking for bribes or sexual favours. Both studies demonstrate 
that, even though vulnerable groups such as the sick and elderly can occasionally benefit 
from informal tax exemptions, it is often the more powerful traders who are able to avoid 
taxes, while the weakest, often women, are more vulnerable to extortion. 
 
Market tax collection in Tanzania is performed by different public and private actors. In the 
2000s many Tanzanian local government authorities started to outsource local revenue 
collection. The reforms were intended to improve service quality, and reduce the costs and 
risks faced by local government (Walker et al. 2006). A study conducted by Research on 
Poverty Alleviation (Fjeldstad et al. 2005) found that outsourced revenue collection might 
lead to a higher gross revenue collection but also to a considerably lower net collection, 
because the private tax agents incur and deduct high administrative costs. A case study at 
Ubungu bus terminal in Dar es Salaam reveals that the private agent retained 60 per cent of 
the collected revenue from entry fees for vehicles and passengers in 2006 (Fjeldstad et al. 
2005). The same study found that municipal councils in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Kilosa and 
Kisarawe relied heavily on private agents to collect property taxes, markets fees, forestry 
fees and bus stand fees. The main objective of the outsourcing was to reduce costs for the 
municipal council and increase the predictability of revenue collection, because the targeted 
amount is specified in a contract between the municipal authority and the private agent.  
 
A study conducted by Kessy (2013) shows that the purpose of the outsourcing exercise, 
namely to boost revenue collection, has not always been met. Several local government 
authorities reported decreased revenue collection due to collection agents not complying with 
the terms of their contract. A notable challenge was the reluctance of taxpayers to pay taxes, 
fees and other charges to private agents, especially where they were unsatisfied with the 
services they received in return.  
 
 
2  Market organisation and research 
procedures 
 
2.1 Research procedure 
 
Data was collected in two separate phases: the preliminary phase and the in-depth phase. 
 
The objectives of the preliminary phase were to categorise the markets in Dar es Salaam 
according to the tax collection system in place, and to establish an initial understanding of 
possible causal connections between the different collection mechanisms and women’s 
experiences with the tax systems. The researchers visited the 31 biggest markets in Dar es 
Salaam, and conducted short interviews with up to 3 randomly selected female traders at 
each. The findings of the first phase provided the foundation for the in-depth study.  
 
Nine market places were then selected for in-depth study. These were selected to represent 
the different collection systems in existence, and three different districts of Dar es Salaam. 
Focus group discussions (FGDs) with a varying number of participants were conducted. At 
every market, one FGD was conducted with female traders, while at some markets the FGDs 
with female traders were supplemented with additional male-only FGDs as control groups. 
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The participants of the FGDs were randomly selected from the list of market traders that 
every market committee maintains. In all cases a total of 15 participants were randomly 
selected from the list, but the actual number of participants varied from case to case due to 
the unavailability of some market traders. In addition to the FGDs, the researchers conducted 
in-depth interviews with market committee members,3 representatives of the municipal 
council and municipal or private tax collectors. The FGDs and interviews were supplemented 
with a short questionnaire that was distributed to a total of 100 market traders, and 
completed through interviews at their place of work. The questionnaire focused on the net 
and gross income of the market traders, as well as costs and use of market services.4 
 
2.2 Market governance 
 
Markets in Tanzania generally fall under the jurisdiction of the respective local government 
authorities,5 and are governed through by-laws.6 All three municipalities covered in the study 
require all market traders to be registered with the municipal council. The municipal council is 
responsible for the management of the market places. The by-laws (Ilala Municipal Council 
IMC 2011a, 2011b; Kinondoni Municipal Council KMC 2004, 2002, 2000; Temeke Municipal 
Council TMC 2010a, 2010b) stipulate opening times, waste collection, hygiene, cleanliness 
of the market place and food products, as well as processes for renting out trading places. 
The markets can be categorised according to the goods sold. Most markets are offering 
mixed goods, including food, clothes and different household utensils. Every market consists 
of two different trading spaces: kizimba and kibanda. Kizimba are tables or other small open 
spaces assigned to the traders, sometimes comprising simply designated areas on the 
ground. Kibanda are permanent rooms or small covered structures. 
  
Municipal councils employ market managers, who are responsible for the overall 
management of one or more markets. At bigger markets the market managers often have a 
permanent office. Traders elect a market committee from among themselves.7 The 
committees usually consist of one chairperson and approximately five members. The 
functions and responsibilities vary from one market to the other. The most basic function of 
all committees is to voice the traders’ problems and requests to the municipal council, and 
settle internal disputes and conflicts. In addition to that, many committees organise security 
and cleaning services. At some markets the market committee is responsible for the 
collection of municipal tax on behalf of the municipal council. Certain committees operate 
saving accounts on behalf of the traders. 
 
Market traders also organise themselves into associations, based on the type of goods in 
which they trade. The associations provide a forum for traders to exchange ideas about the 
supply and demand of goods, support each other in case of sickness or death of family 
members, and implement small projects to support their businesses. The activities are 
financed through annual or monthly membership fees. 
 
2.3 Tax collection 
 
Market tax collection falls under the authority of the local government authorities. This is 
stipulated in the Local Government Finance Act (URT 1982a), which states under section 6.1 
                                                          
3  Depending on availability of committee members, ad-hoc FGDs were occasionally organised.  
4  Due to resource limitations, 50 questionnaires were distributed at Kawe market and another 50 at Temeke Stereo. 
These two markets were selected as they represent the two main tax collection systems. At Kawe market, the market 
tax is collected by the market committee; at Temeke Stereo it is collected directly by the local government. The market 
traders who participated in the questionnaire were randomly picked from the market committee list. If a market trader 
was unavailable, another trader was picked from the list. 
5  The Kariakoo Market at Ilala Municipality has an unusual status. It was established under the Kariakoo Market 
Corporation Act no. 36 of 1974 (URT 1974). The Kariakoo Market Corporation reports directly to the President’s Office. 
The chairman and general manager are appointed directly by the president. 
6  Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act (URT 1982b) gives municipal councils the power to make by-laws.  
7  Depending on the market, elections are held every two to four years. 
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that ‘all moneys derived from fees paid in respect of rents of shops, butcheries, market stalls, 
user charges, service charges and entertainment charges’ shall constitute revenue of an 
urban authority. Under section 11, the Act establishes that local government authorities may 
make by-laws to impose rates for the services, things, matters or acts that constitute their 
revenue. 
 
The daily rate for the market tax varies, but among the different markets that we visited 
mostly lies between TZS100 and TZS200 (USD0.04 to USD0.09) per trader. Some markets 
charge differential tax rates based on the different spaces that the traders occupy. Tax rates 
for a kizimba are generally lower than for a kibanda.8 The resulting tax burden is regarded as 
bearable by the majority of traders, men and women alike. The average trader occupying a 
kizimba (henceforth, a kizimba trader) reported an average gross daily income (before fees 
and taxes) of TZS9,200 (USD4.05), while the average kibanda trader reported a gross 
income of TZS34,000 (USD14.98). Women and men did not report any statistically significant 
income differences within the two different categories. But there are significant gender 
differences between the two groups – 62 per cent of the randomly selected kizimba traders 
are female, whereas the majority of kibanda traders are male. Overall, kizimba traders 
account for 90 per cent of the total traders. This means that women traders are more 
numerous.9 
 
Most tax collectors are now equipped with electronic fiscal devices (EFDs) that produce 
personalised electronic tax payment receipts for every trader. However, at some markets tax 
collectors are still using handwritten receipts as they have not yet received any EFDs. 
 
Even though market tax collection falls under the authority of the municipal councils, our 
research highlights the existence of major variations among markets in the ways in which 
taxes are collected – even within the same municipality. This is because collection is partly 
outsourced. While municipal employees directly collect taxes at most markets, outsourcing is 
practiced at seven markets in the city. In five of those cases, market committees act as tax 
collecting agent for the municipality. In the remaining 2 cases – the Kariakoo and Ilala Boma 
markets, which each have more than 1,000 traders and are among the largest markets in the 
city – private companies collect market taxes on contract. 
 
One explanation for the existence of these variations is that the municipal councils are still 
managing the revenue collection from local markets on a trial and error basis, and no ‘single 
perfect system’ has been established yet. This explanation is supported by various municipal 
council representatives we interviewed. One of them said: 
 
Previously we awarded tenders to private individuals and companies … but now we 
changed the system … We changed the system because the companies who won the 
tenders regularly failed to meet the revenue collection targets we set. We now decided 
to use market committees whom we pay 15 per cent of the collected tax. So far they 
have been meeting the target but it is too early to comment on the success. We will 
evaluate the markets and see how it works. We may consider using the previous 
system depending on the results. 
                                                          
8  It has to be noted though that bigger markets such as the Kariakoo market charge considerably higher and more 
differentiated tax rates (TZS1,500 per table and TZS600 for each box carrying goods brought into the market). 
9  Our random sample comprises 98 valid cases, of which 59 are female and 39 male; 55 female kizimba traders and 34 
male kizimba traders; 4 female kibanda traders and 5 male kibanda traders. 
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Figure 1 Average daily gross income of market traders 
 
2.4 Collection systems 
 
At the markets where market committees are responsible for tax collection, the municipal 
council assesses the revenue potential and sets a collection target for the committee based 
on that assessment. The market committees submit the money collected to the municipal 
council on a weekly or monthly basis, depending on the local arrangements. Market 
committees receive 15 per cent of the revenue collected. They use this money for various 
purposes, including small renovation and construction activities, and salaries for security and 
cleaning personnel.  
 
In the case of market tax collection by private companies, the contract is awarded through 
open public tendering. Prior to the tender process, the municipal council conducts a revenue 
potential assessment and sets a revenue collection target.  
 
All traders interviewed prefer tax to be collected by the market committee rather than the 
municipal council or private companies. Many traders describe members of the market 
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committee as ‘more understanding’ than other tax collectors as they are ‘one of them’. The 
interaction with them is perceived as positive, and no cases of harassment were reported. 
Depending on the market, the committee members do accept delayed tax payments and on 
rare occasions even write off tax arrears for traders who cannot pay. As members of the 
market committee are doing their own personal business at the market every day, they are in 
a good position to know the business situation of their fellow traders. As one committee 
member described:  
 
Sometimes you pass at the same table two consecutive days and you see the same 
goods. You know that the person did not do any business. Of course it will be difficult to 
pay the tax. In such a case we can sometimes cancel the debts. But we will not tell 
them that we cancelled the debts otherwise they will get used to it. We will just stop 
asking for the money. 
 
Furthermore traders feel they can express their problems and concerns to the market 
committee members. The common perception is that the committee members are friendly, 
take their time to talk to traders, and offer advice or an explanation when collecting tax. This 
point is stressed by different traders, and highlights that the relationship between taxpayer 
and tax collector can be a positive one as long as the taxpayer feels respected and taken 
seriously. In addition, at markets where taxes are collected by a market committee, traders 
tend to have a slightly better understanding of the use of tax revenue and therefore see a 
more direct link between taxes paid and services received at the market.10 It is, however, 
important to bear in mind that this collection method has a much greater potential for 
corruption because of its very personalised nature. 
 
In contrast to tax collection by market committees, tax collection by private companies is 
perceived rather negatively by most taxpayers. Private tax collectors are often described as 
impolite and harsh. According to the traders, they are ‘outsiders who do not have any 
knowledge of the market realities’. Private collectors are described as not being open to any 
kind of discussion, and unwilling to accept excuses or delayed payments. 
 
The experiences with direct collection by the municipal authority are mostly neutral, and the 
system is ranked somewhere inbetween the other two systems in terms of traders’ 
preferences. The interactions with the municipal tax collector during the collection exercise 
are generally described as free of harassment. 
 
Irrespective of the collection system in place, all traders interviewed stated that paying taxes 
is important, and considered it a civic duty. 
  
2.5 General market conditions and services 
 
Dar es Salaam’s marketplaces are generally in a bad condition. One major challenge is the 
condition – or absence – of a sewage system. During the time the research was conducted, 
large areas of most markets were covered in stagnant water and mud. These conditions 
pose manifold health hazards to traders as well as customers, ranging from fungus to 
malaria and cholera. 
  
A further annoyance for the traders is the condition of the market structures. Most markets 
visited do have some roofed structures, at least at the market centre but these structures are 
mostly old and not maintained, and consequently do not provide sufficient shelter from rain 
and sun. All markets provide toilets, but there are often too few toilets, and they are generally 
                                                          
10  In all FGDs conducted at markets where the market committee is responsible for tax collection, the traders listed 
different public services, such as garbage collection and water supply, they believed to be financed with their market 
tax. At 3 of the 4 markets where the municipality directly collects the market tax, the general response of FGD partipants 
was that they were unaware of what their market taxes were used for. 
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poorly maintained. Furthermore, market traders have to pay a fee each time they want to use 
the toilet. This fee ranges from TZS200 to TZS300. As traders start their day at the market 
between 4am and 6am, and close their business between 6pm and 7pm, they have no 
alternative to making regular use of the toilet facilities provided at the market. Consequently, 
the women we talked to stated that they use the toilet facilities on average six times per day, 
while men stated that they use the toilets four times. This means that many women pay up to 
18 times more for their daily toilet usage than they pay as market tax.11 There is often 
insufficient access to fresh water for traders to wash themselves or clean their goods, or only 
available on payment of another fee. This suggests that the markets are breeding places for 
disease.  
 
Garbage collection is organised by the municipal council, and a collection truck picks up 
garbage at regular intervals, once or twice per week. At one market, market traders had to 
pay an additional fee of TZS500 for each garbage collection. This was attributed to the 
informal nature of the market.12 Garbage collection is not paid for at formal markets. The 
actual cleaning of the markets is either organised by the municipal council or by the market 
traders themselves. However, at most of the markets visited, the researchers noticed large 
amounts of garbage lying on the floor. This lack of cleanliness was also one of the main 
concerns voiced by the traders.  
 
Some kind of security service is provided at the majority of markets. In most cases, the 
market committee collects a daily fee of between TZS100 and TZS200 from each trader to 
pay for private security guards to take care of their goods at night. At big markets, like 
Kariakoo and Ilala Boma, private security guards paid by the municipal council also patrol 
during the day. Several traders voiced their dissatisfaction with the security guards. Thefts do 
occur, and the traders rarely get reimbursed for the losses they incur. The fee labelled as 
security fee is also partly used to pay for market cleaners and their equipment at some 
markets. 
 
 
3  Summary and discussion of findings 
 
To some extent, our findings differ from those of other researchers who have studied market 
taxation in Africa from a gender perspective (Section 1). We find no evidence of gender bias 
in the way that market traders are taxed. Women and men traders seem to pay the same 
market taxes, in much the same way. There was no suggestion of sexual harassment of 
female traders by tax collectors – most of whom are male. 
 
Further, women and men traders have very similar opinions on the major issues of market 
organisation that we discussed with them.The vast majority of them prefer that market taxes 
are collected by market committees. The main distinguishing factor between this system and 
collection by employees of either municipal councils or private companies is the fact that the 
market committee tax collectors are not strangers to the market traders, but are actually 
market traders themselves. This leads to a relationship of mutual respect and trust between 
tax collectors and taxpayers, whereby taxpayers feel that the collectors understand their 
personal circumstances, and take into account factors such as lack of business or sickness 
in making decisions about the rigour of collection enforcement. The actual tax collection 
                                                          
11  (Max. Toilet Fee * Average Female # Toilet Usage) / Min. Market Tax). 
12  The Mwananyamala soko la nyuma was informally constructed by traders without permission of the Kinodoni Municipal 
Authority. It has not yet been officially recognised as a formal market, but is tolerated by the authority. The size and 
structure of the market does not differ greatly from formal markets. Market traders at the Mwananyamala soko la nyuma 
do not pay market taxes, but a variety of fees (garbage, security, market association fee, etc.) which make it one of the 
most expensive markets for traders to do their business. The market is located close to the older and formal 
Mwananyamala Kisiwani market, which causes tension between the traders of the two markets. 
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performance of market committees does not lag behind the performance of other systems.13 
During the time the research was conducted, Kinondoni municipal council had just introduced 
tax collection by market committees supervised by municipal market managers at several 
markets, which replaced a direct market tax collection system by the municipal authorities. 
The rationale behind this reform was the expectation that tax collection by market 
committees would increase tax revenue. According to representatives of the Kinondoni 
municipal council, preliminary results of the reform were promising.  
 
In contrast to market committees, traders very much dislike private tax collectors. They are 
generally described as harsh and unsympathetic towards the traders and their situation. But 
we could find no evidence of any kind of gender-based discrimination or harassment of 
market women by the tax collectors, be it collectors from the municipal council, private 
companies or market committees. 
 
More generally, our research highlights a number of challenges that market traders are 
facing at their place of work. These challenges range from insufficient sewage and rubbish 
collection systems, to poor quality, expensive toilets and trouble with the private security 
companies guarding traders’ goods at night. These are all issues about the provision of 
public or collective goods to market traders and their customers. These are mostly matters of 
general or collective interest to the population of Dar es Salaam, with one specific exception 
with very important gender implications – the quality and cost of toilets in markets.  
 
Traders end up paying a much higher share of their income on fees for the use of toilets than 
on market taxes. And women are doubly disadvantaged. First, men can more easily avoid 
toilet fees by going around the next corner or to the next bush. This is a rampant and more or 
less tolerated practice for men in Tanzania. For women, the issue is very different. Several 
studies have highlighted that using such open toilets not only increases women’s 
vulnerability to shame, but also raises the risk of sexual assaults (Lennon 2012; Srinivasan 
2015). Second, women need to use toilets more frequently than men, especially during 
menstruation and pregnancy. 
 
To avoid the high cost of using toilets, the women we interviewed reported drinking and 
eating less, or delaying urination and defecation. These coping mechanisms are not only 
uncomfortable, but also increase health hazards, ranging from dehydration to bacterial 
infection and chronic constipation. The example of a urinary tract infection (UTI) highlights 
the significance of these health hazards, especially for women. Women are in general at 
greater risk of developing a UTI than men. The risk factors for contracting a UTI include 
holding back urine and not drinking enough water. One of the symptoms of an acute UTI is 
the frequent urge to urinate. This means that inadequate access to toilets increases the 
women’s risk of contracting a UTI, and if they are suffering from the infection they are forced 
to use the toilets even more often. UNICEF and WHO (UNICEF and WHO 2005) warn that 
restricted toilet facilities cause psychological stress to women, and the United Nations 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called ensuring women’s access to safe toilets a ‘moral 
imperative’ (UN News 2014). 
 
The average daily income of petty market traders is TZS9,200. This means that female petty 
traders spend between 13 per cent14 and 20 per cent15 of their income on toilet fees, whereas 
men only spend between 9 per cent16 and 13 per cent17. This is a significant difference, 
                                                          
13  According to the market manager of Kinondoni Municipality, the tax collection perfomance of market committees is at 
times even better than the performance of municipal employees and private tax collectors.  
14  Min. Female Toilet Fee Burden = Average daily income / (Max. Toilet Fee * Average Female # Toilet Usage). 
15  Max. Female Toilet Fee Burden = Average daily income / (Max. Toilet Fee * Average Female # Toilet Usage). 
16  Min. Male Toilet Fee Burden = Average daily income / (Min. Toilet Fee * Average Male # Toilet Usage). 
17  Max. Male Toilet Fee Burden = Average daily income / (Max. Toilet Fee * Average Male # Toilet Usage). 
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which is amplified by the fact that the majority of small market traders are women.18 Paying 
close to one-fifth of their daily gross income on toilet fees is utterly disproportionate, and 
inhibits women from earning a dignified salary and expanding their businesses. 
 
But is this a taxation issue? A reader specialised in taxation in the conventional sense of the 
term might respond: ‘This is of course a serious problem, but it is about public service 
provision, not about taxation. Toilet fees are service charges, not taxes’. They might even 
add: ‘You are distorting the discussion of taxes in Africa to serve a particular agenda relating 
to women’. We do not agree with them. This is why. 
 
The conceptual distinction between the two is quite clear. A tax is a mandatory financial 
charge imposed upon a taxpayer by a governmental organisation in order to fund various 
public expenditure. The taxpayer has no claim to any specific reciprocal benefit. A user fee, 
however, is charged to fund a specific service: if you use a service, you pay for it. If not, you 
do not pay. The fee is proportional to the use of the service (Spitzer 2003). In practice, 
however, the distinction between a tax and a user fee is often blurred. Many transfers of 
money from citizens to state organisations could equally well be classified as taxes or service 
charges – that is, as non-tax revenue. For example, at the national level, many governments 
levy some kind of social security charge on income earners or their employers to pay for old-
age pensions, unemployment benefits, or social transfers for people on low incomes. Are 
these taxes or user charges? They would clearly be user charges if all the revenue was used 
for the purposes listed above, if it were only used for that purpose, and if payments were in 
some way proportional to contributions. Conversely, if all social security payments were 
determined purely by general government policy decisions, and were not in practice linked at 
all to the financial situation of a social security fund, then we would clearly be talking about 
taxes. In reality, most public funding of social security is achieved through a complex mixture 
of these two pure principles. This means that the classification of social security contributions 
in government financial statistics nearly always contains a high element of ambiguity. We 
cannot clearly say whether we are talking of taxes or user charges. A similar ambiguity 
occurs much more frequently in the finances of sub-national and local governments. They 
frequently raise a great deal of their income from what are formally service charges: for street 
cleaning, garbage clearance and sewage services, the provision of water and electricity, 
vehicle parking, and the provision of sports services of various kinds. But a deep concern to 
correlate the actual level of charges made to users with the cost of providing the service is 
rare. Some users are subsidised. Others find that they are in effect being taxed because their 
local government is using service provision as a way of raising revenue.  
 
So we should not be diverted by any claim that user charges for toilets in Dar-Es-Salaam’s 
markets are not really taxes. But diverted from what? From our underlying motivation for 
conducting this research in the first place: to examine how far the modes of funding the 
provision of collective services in those market places are adequately serving the interests of 
society in general, and of women in particular. We started by focusing on taxes because the 
existing literature implied that this is where we might find gender biases. We did not find 
them in the domain of taxes, narrowly defined as the charges collected from the market 
traders under the label of market taxes. But we did find biases when we looked more broadly 
at the financing of public or collective goods in the markets. All public goods – water, 
cleanliness, garbage disposal, shelter, security – are underfunded. This seems to impact 
men and women equally. But the underfunding of toilets, and the charges that are made for 
use of them, has a differential and adverse impact on women, especially market traders, but 
also their female customers. Women require toilets more frequently than men, and have 
fewer alternatives.  
 
                                                          
18  Toilet fees are regressive, and small market traders spend a higher proportion of their income on toilet usage than larger 
traders. 
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A gender-aware perspective on market taxation required us to look wholistically at gender-
differentiated patterns of use and funding of collective goods and services. Narrow ‘taxation-
accounting’ might mislead us. There are lessons here for the study of gender dimensions of 
taxation more broadly. Especially in environments like those of Dar es Salaam, where a high 
proportion of women earn their living from small-scale trading, we may need to appraise the 
tax system for gender equity. We need to look beyond formal employment markets and the 
incidence of income tax systems, which are anyway being reformed in most of Africa to 
eliminate obvious gender bias. We also need to apply a broad approach, which includes all 
financial charges imposed upon actors in the informal sector. Biases that exist in the informal 
sector may not stand out clearly. They might be embedded in public finance more broadly – 
in the collective impact of the way public services are both financed and consumed (Joshi 
2017).  
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